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Joseph de Maistre's Civilization 
and its Discontents 
Graeme Garrard 
In his study of Sigmund Freud's social and political thought Paul Roazen 
claims that Freud was the first to depict the human psyche as torn between 
two fundamentally antithetical tendencies: 
The notion of a human nature in conflict with itself, disrupted by the 
opposition of social and asocial inclinations, the view that the social self 
develops from an asocial nucleus but that the social trends are also 
dynamic and emotional in nature, and finally the conception that 
reason's control can be extended by a detailed knowledge of the 
repressed asocial tendencies-all this was not known before Freud.' 
Although Freud is undoubtedly the most famous modem exponent of this 
conception of human nature at war with itself, he was by no means its first, let 
alone only, proponent. Kant, for example, wrote of the "unsocial sociability of 
men" over a century earlier.2 An even more unlikely precursor of this basic 
assumption of Freudian social psychology is the Catholic reactionary Joseph de 
Maistre (1753-1821). The social theory elaborated by this arch-paladin of 
throne and altar-who was, quite literally, plus royalist que le roi, plus 
catholique que le Pape-is strikingly similar to that expressed by Freud in his 
famous essay Civilization and Its Discontents (1929).3 
I would like to acknowledge my debt to Sir Isaiah Berlin for the time and attention he 
generously gave me to discuss the thought of Joseph de Maistre (and many other subjects) 
with him while I was a graduate student at Oxford University, when the first draft of this 
essay was written. 
1 Paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York, 1968), 249-50. 
2 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in 
Kant's Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970), 44-45. This 
work was first published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, 4 (11 November 1784), 385-411. 
3 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, tr. Joan Riviere, ed. James Strachey 
(London, 1979). 
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Both conceived of the individual as "a being both social and evil,"4 
perpetually struggling to prevent the innate aggressiveness of the species 
from plunging society into a Hobbesian war of all against all. That is why 
Freud insisted that it "has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to 
man's aggressive instincts,"5 a view advanced over a century earlier by 
Maistre. Events in Europe after 1789 led many conservatives such as Maistre, 
as events after 1914 would lead Freud, to reject the common Enlightenment 
view of human beings as naturally sociable and of social life as a reflection of 
the spontaneous harmony of a natural world governed by laws established by 
God and discoverable by reason. In Maistre's view, social and political life 
are better understood as the artificial and fundamentally precarious imposi- 
tion of order on the violent flux of nature. Anticipating Freud, he asserts that 
individuals, if left to their own devices in society, would soon be plunged 
into a state of social warfare identical to that which Hobbes had attributed to 
the state of nature. His particular brand of extreme conservative thought 
derives its social and political authoritarianism from these deeply pessimistic 
social assumptions, which leave him with more in common (on this subject) 
with Freud than with either the Enlightenment or fellow conservatives such 
as Edmund Burke. 
Homo Homini Lupus 
The pessimistic, even tragic, argument of Civilization and Its Discon- 
tents is that human beings are driven by extremely powerful instincts, the full 
satisfaction of which is incompatible with social life. According to Freud, the 
"cultural frustration" that ensues from this incompatibility "dominates the 
large field of social relationships between human beings. As we already 
know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations has to 
struggle."6 Unhappiness, understood as the non-satisfaction of these basic 
libidinal urges, is therefore a necessary part of human association. "One feels 
inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy,' " Freud writes 
pessimistically, "is not included in the plan of 'Creation.' "7 
Freud also argues that, in addition to these basically erotic instincts, there 
is a "constitutional inclination in human beings to be aggressive towards one 
another,"8 which "constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization."9 
4 Joseph de Maistre, "De 1'etat de nature," ch. 2, in Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1884- 
1931), VII, 563 (hereafter cited as OC). 
5 Freud, op. cit., 49. 
6 Ibid., 34. 
7 Ibid., 13. 
8 Ibid., 79. 
9 Ibid., 59. 
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This ineliminable tendency accounts for Freud's Hobbesian view of the 
precariousness of civilization:10 
[M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most 
can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, 
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a 
powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for 
them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who 
tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his 
capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without 
his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him 
pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of 
all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute 
this assertion?" 
This innate aggressiveness poses a constant threat to the social bond, 
which is "perpetually threatened with disintegration" by "this primary 
mutual hostility of human beings."'2 Writing in the shadow of the First 
World War, just as Maistre wrote in the context of the French Revolution, 
Freud speaks disdainfully of those who claim that human beings are naturally 
good and that the aggression and cruelty so evident in human history is 
attributable to contingent external factors that can be overcome.13 "For 'little 
children do not like it,' " he writes sarcastically, "when there is talk of the 
inborn human inclination to 'badness,' to aggressiveness and destructive- 
ness, and so to cruelty as well."14 
At most, Freud claims, this native aggression can be held in check or 
channelled in socially benign directions. "Civilization, therefore, obtains 
mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression," he writes, 
"by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to 
watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city."'5 It cannot, however, be 
eliminated. Freud mentions nationalism as an example of the beneficial 
outward venting of these powerful destructive urges. He refers to this "con- 
venient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression 
by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made 
easier" as the "narcissism of minor differences," an antipathy commonly 
'1 On Freud's similarities to Hobbes, see Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New 
York, 1988), 546; Paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought, 154, 213; Jeffrey B. 
Abramson, Liberation and Its Limits: The Moral and Political Thought of Freud (New 
York, 1984), 4, 11, 52-53, 133-34, 137-38. 
' Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 48. 
12 Ibid., 49. 
13 Ibid., 50-52. 
'4 Ibid., 57. 
'5 Ibid., 60-61. 
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found among immediate neighbors.16 However, this aggression can also be 
"internalized" by directing it back at its source, where it is "taken over by a 
portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super- 
ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience,' is ready to put into action 
against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked 
to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.""7 The tension that develops 
between the "strict" super-ego and the "subordinate" ego Freud calls guilt, 
which is manifested as "the need for punishment."'8 This "internal police- 
man," the superego, reduces somewhat the need for the external repression 
of aggression. 
Thus, according to Freud, society rests precariously upon the basis of an 
ineliminable dialectic of aggression and repression. Our sexual drives and 
primal aggressiveness are locked in a perpetual struggle with both the 
superego of the individual and the social superego. These innate destructive 
forces occasionally shatter the fragile bonds of society against which they are 
in constant, incipient rebellion, erupting in violent bursts of destruction and 
barbarism such as the Reign of Terror and the First World War. Although 
Freud claims that "what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our 
misery and that we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to 
primitive conditions,"'9 he nonetheless believes that we are also social 
beings, and that the achievement of civilization lies in its ability to control 
and direct our destructive anti-social tendencies, which it does, in part, 
through interalization and the "sublimation" of erotic energies. However, 
this achievement comes at the price of our happiness and leads to the 
"tormenting uneasiness" of civilized life.20 
Although Freud accepted the need for a considerable degree of instinctual 
repression, he also believed that moder civilization had more than met this 
need, and had actually become excessively restrictive. One of the objectives 
of psychoanalysis is actually to "oppose the super-ego" and to "endeavour 
to lower its demands" under such conditions. Notwithstanding this belief in 
the need for reform, Freud denied the possibility of the transcendence of this 
primal struggle between Eros and Thanatos, which underlies social life and 
individual psychology. While he was sympathetic to critics of civilization, he 
was unwilling to offer any such "false" consolation. 
Freud combines the psychological assumptions of Aristotle and Hobbes 
to produce a theory according to which society is a source of both human 
fulfillment and frustration. In effect he sought to replace conventional views 
about human nature with a more complex psychological theory that com- 
bined elements from other theories traditionally regarded as contradictory. In 
16 Ibid., 51. 
17 Ibid., 60. 
18 Ibid., 60. 
19 Ibid., 23. 
20 J. B. Abramson, Liberation and Its Limits, 9. 
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Joseph de Maistre 
Freud and Society Yiannis Gabriel describes Freud's dualism as a "stubborn 
refusal to look at the individual as an integrated personality or character and 
through his insistence that each person is a fragmented complex of different 
and often contradictory functions ... Freud avoids the shortcomings of most 
theorists who try to articulate the relationship between the individual and 
society."21 
"A Being Both Social and Evil" 
When the French Revolution began, Joseph de Maistre was a provincial 
magistrate living in the quiet obscurity of French-speaking Savoy, which was 
then part of the independent kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. Despite his 
provincial, conservative upbringing and orthodox education by Jesuits, 
Maistre had a considerable interest in modern ideas, which he retained 
throughout his life. He read surprisingly widely in philosophy, science, and 
literature and, as his writings abundantly demonstrate, he was familiar with 
the important ideas of his age. He also had a natural curiosity about modern 
science, owned a large and diverse library, was an enthusiastic reader of 
contemporary periodical literature,22 and enjoyed the intellectual stimulation 
he received in the salons of Lausanne and St. Petersburg, at which he was a 
popular guest. Indeed, as Jean-Louis Darcel argues, Maistre probably under- 
went a "religious crisis" at the end of his adolescence as a result of his 
exposure to such ideas. "Nourished in the thought of the Enlightenment," he 
writes, "Joseph de Maistre saw the certitudes he had inherited from his father 
shaken by the arguments of the philosophes."23 
Although Maistre eventually repudiated the ideas and values of Enlight- 
enment France, he was raised, educated, and grew into middle age during the 
later Enlightenment. He was nearly forty years old when the French Revolu- 
tion began. He was a moderate supporter of reform in the years prior to 1789, 
and was an occasional critic of the regime of his reactionary sovereign. Also, 
despite Pope Benedict's anti-Masonic bull of 1751 and the strong disap- 
proval of his own government, the Catholic Maistre was an active freemason 
21 Yiannis Gabriel, Freud and Society (London, 1983), 151. 22 See R. A. Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre: An Intellectual Militant (Montreal, 1988), 37, 
and Jean-Louis Darcel, "Les Bibliotheques de Joseph de Maistre, 1768-1821," Revue des 
etudes maistriennes, 9 (1985), 5-123 (hereafter cited as REM). English translation in 
Maistre Studies, tr. R. A. Lebrun (New York, 1988), 3-41 (hereafter cited as MS). Darcel 
writes: "If metaphysics occupied only a modest place in J. de Maistre's library (4 titles for 
the Greeks and Romans), his interest in modem metaphysics must be noted (15 titles of 
which 10 were published after 1770). Works appearing here include those of Descartes, 
Fenelon, Cudworth, Mosheim, Helv6tius, Locke (4 works), and Saint-Martin (3 volumes)" 
(19 [MS, 13]). Also, see R. A. Lebrun, "Les lectures de Joseph de Maistre d'apr&s des 
registres in6dites," REM, 9 (1985), 126-94 (MS, 42-64). 
23 J.-L. Darcel, "Des p6nitents noirs a la franc-maconnerie de la sensibilit6 
maistriennes," REM, 5-6 (1980), 93 (MS, 120). 
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Graeme Garrard 
and an admirer of the mystical "illuminist" ideas of Jean-Baptiste Willer- 
moz and Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, the so-called "philosophe inconnu." 
The police in Turin kept a secret file detailing Maistre's Masonic activities 
and liberal opinions and his Letters of a Savoyard Royalist, published in 
1793, had been banned. In the spring and summer of 1788 he was an 
enthusiastic partisan of the French parlementaires and endorsed their cam- 
paign to force the calling of an Estates-General. There is even some evidence 
that he may have considered joining their ranks himself.24 
In 1793 Maistre began working on two essays intended to refute some of 
the principal ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was then the hero of the 
French Revolution. One of his main objections to Rousseau, an objection that 
appears in several of his works, is his reliance on the "chimera" of a social 
contract, which presumes that human beings can create societies and govern- 
ments. Maistre denies that the species is capable of such constructive under- 
takings: 
The philosophes of this century who shook the bases of society never 
ceased to tell us about the views men had in uniting in society. It suffices 
to cite Rousseau speaking for all of them. Peoples, he says, have given 
themselves Chiefs to defend their freedom and not to enslave them- 
selves. This is a gross error, mother of all others. Man gives himself 
nothing; he receives everything. He has chiefs because he cannot do 
without them, and society never is nor can be the result of a pact.25 
According to Maistre's theocentric outlook, political society is the creation 
of divine, not human, will. "[S]overeignty comes from God," he writes in 
his anti-Rousseau essay "De la Souverainete du Peuple," "since he is the 
author of everything, except evil, and in particular he is the author of 
society."26 He later adds: 
Rousseau and all the reasoners of his kind imagine or try to imagine a 
people in the state of nature (this is their expression), deliberating 
formally on the advantages and disadvantages of the social state and 
finally deciding to pass from one to the other.... It is a capital mistake 
to represent the social state as a chosen state founded on the consent of 
men, on a deliberation, and on an original contract.27 
Maistre also invokes what he takes to be the testimony of history to refute 
social contract theory. History, he argues, is "experimental politics," from 
which facts about man and politics can be deduced through disinterested 
24 R. A. Lebrun, Joseph de Maistre, 95. 25 
"De 1'6tat de nature," ch. 2 (OC, VII, 563-64). 26 Joseph de Maistre, "De la Souverainete du Peuple," book 1, ch. 1 (OC, I, 314). 27 
"De la Souverainete du Peuple," book 1, ch. 2 (OC, I, 317-18). 
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observation, a method he opposes to the abstract, a priori speculations of 
modem philosophy.28 "Every question about the nature of man must be 
resolved by history," he writes. "The philosopher who wants to prove to us 
by a priori reasoning what man must be, does not merit being heard."29 
Applying this method, Maistre concludes that "history tells us that man is a 
social being who has always been observed in society."30 
Maistre's attack on social contract theory was entirely consistent with the 
dominant view of the philosophes on the subject. During the period between 
the middle of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century new ideas about the relationship between the individual and society 
emerged as part of the growing disenchantment with contract theory and its 
correlative conception of human nature as entirely given pre-socially. Social 
contract theory was closely associated with the writings of Hobbes and Locke 
in particular, who had depicted society as the deliberate creation of rational 
individuals motivated by a self-interested desire to avoid the hazards and 
inconveniences of the natural, presocial world.3' The strong individualism 
presupposed by this view assumes a sharp ontological separation of the 
individual from society, which are related only instrumentally and contin- 
gently. It regards fully-formed individuals as prior to both political society 
and all social interaction. "What contractarianism does require," writes 
David Gauthier, "is, first of all, that individual human beings not only can, 
but must, be understood apart from society."32 As such, he continues, it is 
"incompatible with the view that men undergo fundamental change in 
becoming members of society. Men's reasons for contracting one with 
another are supposed to arise out of their presocial needs in the state of 
nature.... Society is thus conceived as a mere instrument for men whose 
fundamental motivation is presocial, nonsocial, and fixed."33 
According to this view, a person in the state of nature is presumed to have 
a pre-formed identity, interests, needs and desires, a free will, and a certain 
capacity for instrumental rationality. Society is regarded as neither the neces- 
sary medium through which human identity develops nor as instrumental to 
human agency. By the time Rousseau's Social Contract was published in 
1762 the social contract theory still widely accepted by the writers of the 
early Enlightenment was therefore already in decline.34 As J. W. Gough 
28 
"De l'6tat de nature," ch. 1 (OC, VII, 540). Also, see "De la Souverainete du 
Peuple," book 2, ch. 2 (OC, I, 426). 
29 "De la Souverainete du Peuple," book 1, ch. 2 (OC, I, 316). 3 
"De l'etat de nature," ch. 1 (OC, VII, 541). 31 Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, 1992), 126, categorizes Hobbes as 
the leading representative of what he calls "unrestricted contractarianism." 
32 D. Gauthier, "The Social Contract as Ideology," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6/ 
2 (1977), 138. 
33 Ibid., 138-39. 
34 For an account of the historical decline of contract theory in the eighteenth century, 
see J. W. Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development (Oxford, 1957), 
186-206. 
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notes, "[T]he late eighteenth century was a period when men were losing 
their belief in the older, naive contractarianism, which accepted the contract 
as literally true, yet they had not succeeded in finding a new theory of 
government to take its place."35 
The influence of David Hume on the trend away from concepts such as 
the state of nature, the social contract, and natural law was considerable at 
this time. His 1748 essay "Of the Original Contract" presents a strong case 
against the "fallacious and sophistical" theory of the social contract.36 He 
also subjected the whole enterprise of moder natural law theory and its 
assumptions to the same kind of devastating skeptical critique. Natural law, 
natural rights, and contract theory were also increasingly challenged in the 
years after 1750 by new doctrines such as utilitarianism, so that by the end of 
the century there was at best a "half-hearted and often inconsistent rejection 
of some and acceptance of other parts of the contractarian system."37 
With very few exceptions, therefore, the philosophes believed in the 
natural sociability of the species.38 In his Persian Letters (1721), for ex- 
ample, Montesquieu relates this belief to a rejection of the contractarian idea 
of a pre-social state of nature. "Every discussion of international law that I 
have ever heard," he writes, "has begun with a careful investigation into the 
origin of society, which seems to me absurd ... they [men] are all associated 
with each other at birth."39 He repeats this point in The Spirit of the Laws 
(1748), in which he declares that human beings were "[m]ade for living in 
society."40 Voltaire, often regarded as the most representative figure of the 
French Enlightenment, shared this view. "It seems clear to me," he wrote to 
Frederick the Great, "that God designed us to live in society-just as he has 
given the bees the instincts and the powers to make honey."41 In a direct 
response to Rousseau he wrote that "I do not think that this solitary life, 
which our forefathers are supposed to have led, is in human nature.... The 
foundation of society ever-existing, there has therefore ever been some 
society."42 
35 Ibid., 191. 
36 A Treatise of Human Nature (1737-40), Bk. 3, ?9, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by 
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978), 549; "Of the Original Contract," in Three Essays, Moral 
and Political (Edinburgh, 1748); and in Hume: Political Essays, ed. K. Haakonssen 
(Cambridge, 1994), 186-201. See S. Buckle and D. Castiglione, "Hume's Critique of 
Contract Theory," History of Political Thought, 12/3 (1991), 457-80, and for a contrary 
interpretation D. Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review, 88 
(1979), 3-38. 
37 J. W. Gough, The Social Contract, 191. 
38 See my "Rousseau, Maistre and the Counter-Enlightenment," History of Political 
Thought, 15 (1994), 97-120. 
39 Persian Letters, no. 94, tr. C. J. Betts (Harmondsworth, 1973), 175. 
40 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, tr. A. Cohler, B. C. Miller, and H. S. Stone 
(Cambridge, 1989), 5. 
41 Voltaire to Frederick the Great, 15 October 1737, in Voltaire: Selections, ed. P. 
Edwards (London, 1989), 209. 
42 The Philosophy of History (1765) (New York, 1965), 27. 
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Joseph de Maistre 
Diderot also postulated the natural sociability of human beings.43 Society 
is natural, he points out in his Encyclopedie article "Societe," because our 
weakness demands a social milieu, and nature, by way of compensation for 
our frailty, "endowed him [man] with two gifts to make him superior to 
animals, I mean reason and sociability."44 This Enlightenment view of 
humans as naturally sociable was shared by most conservatives in the late- 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They opposed the idea of society as the 
deliberate creation of individuals in a presocial state of nature, motivated by 
a self-interested desire to avoid the hazards and inconveniences of the 
natural, presocial world. Edmund Burke, who believed that Rousseau's 
views lead to "an unsocial independence,"45 traced the origins of the French 
Revolution to what he regarded as Rousseau's individualistic revolt against 
the bonds of society, in which he privileged individual conscience over all 
else.46 
What distinguishes Maistre from both conservatives such as Burke and 
the philosophes is the emphasis he places on the anti-social aspects of human 
nature. Despite Maistre's repeated affirmation of the natural sociability of the 
species, his experiences after 1790 prevented him from subscribing to this 
view in any straightforward sense. His more complex mature outlook was 
formed in response to the violence and disruption of the French Revolution, 
which accentuated the dark, misanthropic dimension of his outlook and 
fuelled in him an almost desperate need for order. By the middle of the 1790s 
Maistre had been forced to flee from Savoy as the advancing army of 
revolutionary France annexed his homeland and confiscated his property. He 
would not return to live in his native Savoy again for nearly twenty-five 
years. By the middle of the decade, moreover, Louis XVI had been executed 
and the Terror had begun. Maistre was traumatized by these events to such an 
extent that he was gradually transformed from a moderate conservative and 
cautious reformer critical of social contract theory who shared the Enlighten- 
ment belief in human sociability into a full-blown reactionary for whom 
"society is really a state of war."47 The works for which he is now best 
known all date from after this transformation in his views. 
43 Oeuvres completes, ed. J. Assezat and M. Toureux (Paris, 1875-77), I, 431. 
44 OC, XVII, 131, 134, quoted in Charles Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism: A 
Study of the Interrelations of Moral and Social Theory in English and French Thought 
Between 1689 and 1789 (Liverpool, 1967), 185. 
45 The Works and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, VI, ed. R. 
and C. Rivington (London, 1852), 33. 
46 "A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," in Edmund Burke: Selected 
Writings and Speeches, ed. P. Stanlis (New York, 1963), 512; and see J.-F. Suter, "Burke, 
Hegel and the French Revolution," in Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Per- 
spectives, ed. Z. Pelcynski (Cambridge, 1971), 52-72. 
47 Maistre, "De l'6tat de nature," ch. 2 (OC, VII, 563). Freud also suffered several 
traumatic personal setbacks prior to writing Civilization and Its Discontents: his second 
daughter died in 1920, and he was diagnosed as having cancer in 1923. 
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Although the Revolution had a fundamental influence on Burke's 
thought, it did not affect his life as directly as it did Maistre's. Also, Burke 
was a generation older than Maistre, whose first major work appeared the 
year of the former's death. Unlike Burke, Maistre was not given to waxing 
nostalgic about the natural harmony of human beings living in the quiet 
repose of their "little platoons." It is difficult to imagine him, for whom 
"[t]he entire earth, continually steeped in blood, is only an immense altar on 
which every living thing must be immolated without end,"48 writing "A 
Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origins of our Ideas on the Sublime and the 
Beautiful." As Isaiah Berlin writes in his seminal study of Maistre, his 
"violent preoccupation with blood and death belongs to another world from 
the rich and tranquil England of Burke's imagination.... This is neither 
quietism nor conservatism, neither blind faith in the status quo."49 
From the middle of the 1790s on, therefore, Maistre actually portrayed 
human nature as a turbulent combination of conflicting social and anti-social 
impulses. "Vice separates men," he writes, "just as virtue unites them."50 
For much of history, it has been the former that has dominated human affairs. 
He writes in his unfinished essay "De la Souverainete du Peuple," echoing 
Hobbes, that "[m]an is insatiable for power; he is infinite in his desires, and, 
always discontented with what he has, he loves what he has not."5' Years 
later in his St. Petersburg Dialogues (1821) Maistre wrote that "man's 
strongest inclinations are vicious to the point of obviously tending towards 
the destruction of society, that man has no greater enemy than himself,"52 
anticipating Freud's notion of a "destructive instinct" in human nature. He 
contemptuously dismisses the idea of the "natural goodness" of the species 
in favor of an Augustinian depiction of a perpetual cosmic battle of good and 
evil played out both within and among individuals. 
This is the heart of Maistre's dualistic metaphysical system, which recurs 
throughout his mature writings. In his first major work, written during the 
Revolution, Maistre writes: 
48 Joseph de Maistre, Saint-Petersburg Dialogues, dialogue 6, tr. R. A. Lebrun 
(Montreal, 1993), 217 (OC, IV, 25). 
49 Isaiah Berlin, "Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism," The Crooked Timber 
of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London, 1990), 112. Berlin's essay 
interprets this difference between Maistre and more moderate conservatives such as Burke 
as evidence of the former's modernistic proto-fascism but does not develop this controver- 
sial argument, despite the title of his essay. Also, see his introduction to R. A. Lebrun's 
translation of Consideration on France (Cambridge, 1994). On the relationship between 
Burke and Maistre, see Frederick Holdsworth, Joseph de Maistre et l'Angleterre (Paris, 
1935), 246-49; B. Mazlish, "Burke, Bonald and de Maistre: A Study in Conservatism" 
(Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1955); Michel Fuchs, "Edmund Burke et Joseph de 
Maistre," Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 54 (1984), 49-58; Jean-Louis Darcel, "Les 
Bibliotheques de Joseph de Maistre, 1768-1821," REM, 9 (1985), 101; R. A. Lebrun, 
Joseph de Maistre, 100-103. 
50 St. Petersburg Dialogues, dialogue 10, 293 (OC, V, 173). 51 Ibid., book 2, ch. 2 (OC, I, 449). 52 Ibid., dialogue 1, 24 (OC, IV, 43). 
438 Graeme Garrard 
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.50 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 11:03:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Joseph de Maistre 
There is nothing but violence in the universe; but we are spoiled by the 
modem philosophy that tells us that all is good, whereas evil has tainted 
everything and that in a very real sense all is evil, since nothing is in its 
place. The keynote of the system of our creation has been lowered, and 
following the rules of harmony, all the others have been lowered 
proportionately. All creation groans, and tends with pain and effort 
towards another order of things.53 
In his next published work, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political 
Constitutions (1814), Maistre states that "[t]here is nothing good that evil 
does not sully or alter; there is no evil, that goodness does not repress and 
attack, by impelling continually all existence towards a more perfect state. 
These two forces are every where present."54 According to the St. Petersburg 
Dialogues, it is original sin "which explains everything and without which 
nothing can be explained."55 In this work Maistre claims that man is really 
"[a]n inconceivable combination of two different and incompatible powers, 
a monstrous centaur, he feels that he is the result of some unknown crime, 
some detestable mixture that has vitiated man even in his deepest essence,"56 
as a result of which human association is simultaneously natural and a "state 
of war," a view befitting his Manichean belief in "the existence in the 
universe of two opposing forces, which are in continual conflict."57 Thus, 
while rejecting contractarianism, Maistre appropriated much of Hobbes's 
pessimistic account of the passions that make social life so precarious and 
necessitate a substantial measure of political and cultural repression. 
In addition to this emphasis on the anti-social proclivity of human nature, 
Maistre rejected the Enlightenment belief that the universe is governed by 
"an essential, general and natural order."58 There had been a broad consen- 
sus among the philosophes that nature is governed by an orderly system of 
uniform and regular laws, created and presided over by a remote, benevolent 
deity and discoverable by sensory experience. By studying the orderly pat- 
terns of nature individuals could come to know these natural laws and thereby 
understand and, to some extent, even control their world. "[I]t was not in 
Holy Writ," Carl Becker writes in his study of the Enlightenment, "but in 
the great book of nature, open for all mankind to read, that the laws of God 
had been recorded."59 The traditional Christian belief in original sin was 
53 Considerations on France, tr. R. A. Lebrun (Cambridge, 1994), 62 (OC, I, 39). 
54 Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions (1847) (New York, 
1977), 114-15 (OC, I, 276). 
55 St. Petersburg Dialogues, dialogue 2, 33 (OC, IV, 61-62). 
56 Ibid., dialogue 2, 36 (OC, IV, 67). 
57 Essay on the Generative Principle, ?40, 114 (OC, I, 276). 
58 Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, De l'origine et des progres d'une science 
nouvelle, repr. in E. Daire, Physiocrates (Paris, 1846), 337-38. 
59 The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1932), 51. 
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rejected by many philosophes in favor of an essentially benevolent concep- 
tion of the natural world. As J. H. Brumfitt writes, "Man was good, Nature 
was good, and a fundamental harmony existed between them. Such was the 
creed the philosophes proclaimed."60 Voltaire shared this belief in the natural 
benevolence of human beings and the existence of a providential order and 
explicitly connected the harmony of nature with his deist conception of God 
as "the eternal machine-maker":61 
[T]he unvarying uniformity of the laws which control the march of the 
heavenly bodies, the movements of our globe, every species and genus 
of animal, plant, and mineral, indicates that there is one mover. If there 
were two, they would either differ, or be opposed to each other, or like 
each other. If they were different, there would be no harmony; if 
opposed, things would destroy each other; if like, it would be as if there 
were only one-a twofold employment.62 
Nature is not only harmonious, according to the philosophes, but it is 
also unified. "[A]ll bodies of which this universe is made up," d'Alembert 
writes, "form a single system, whose parts are interdependent and whose 
interrelations derive from the harmony of the whole."63 According to this 
view, society reflects this natural harmony.64 What the writers of the early 
Enlightenment saw in both the natural and social worlds were their essential 
architectonic order and harmony. Natural law, for example, was nothing 
more than "the observed harmonious behaviour of material objects."65 By 
allowing society freely to operate in accordance with the laws of nature, the 
harmony of the natural order would be reflected in the social, economic and 
political life of man. As Norman Hampson notes, "In one form or another 
most of the philosophes believed in an 'invisible hand.' "66 
Maistre's views on this subject reflect the reaction against this image of 
nature which emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, a reaction 
obviously fuelled by the course of events in France after 1789. It is hardly 
surprising that the influence of Hobbes, so apparent in Maistre, grew in 
France after 1760 as the assumptions of the early Enlightenment were 
increasingly challenged.67 For as Stephen Collins's description of Hobbes 
makes clear, he understood that 
60 The French Enlightenment (London, 1972), 96. 
61 Traite de metaphysique (1734), ch. 8, in Voltaire: Selections, 92. 
62 Selected Works of Voltaire, tr. Joseph McCabe (London, 1935), 9. 
63 Jean d'Alembert, "Qualit6s cosmiques," in L'Encyclopedie, IV, quoted in T. L. 
Hankins, Jean d'Alembert: Science and the Enlightenment (Oxford, 1970), 106. 
64 See A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 183-241. 
65 The Heavenly City, 57. 
66 N. Hampson, "The Enlightenment in France," in The Enlightenment in National 
Context, ed. R. Porter and M. Teich (Cambridge, 1981), 41-42. 
67 Hampson, The Enlightenment, 84. 
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a world in flux was natural and that order must be created to restrain 
what was natural.... Society is no longer a transcendentally articulated 
reflection of something predefined, external, and beyond itself which 
orders existence hierarchically.... Order must be designed to restrain 
what appeared ubiquitous [that is, flux].... Fundamental to the entire 
reconceptualization of the idea of society was the belief that the 
commonwealth, as was order, was a human creation.68 
Among the most pessimistic accounts of the ruthlessness and violence of 
nature to be found anywhere occur in Maistre's mature writings, with their 
notorious descriptions of constant blood-letting as natural, inescapable, and, 
up to a point, even beneficial. In Considerations on France he claims that 
"when the human soul has lost its strength through laziness, incredulity, and 
the gangrenous vices that follow an excess of civilization, it can be 
retempered only in blood," which is "the manure of the plant we call 
genius." Mankind, he says, is a tree "which an invisible hand is continually 
pruning." And as with a tree, "the skilful gardener directs the pruning less 
towards lush vegetation than towards the fructification of the tree; he wants 
fruit, not wood or leaves."69 
Maistre devotes a chapter to "the Violent Destruction of the Human 
Species," noting that the "illustrious" Buffon "has proven quite clearly that 
a large percentage of animals are destined to die a violent death."70 He then 
adds that Buffon "could apparently have extended the demonstration to 
man,"71 which is precisely what Maistre proceeds to do, beginning with a 
long "frightful catalogue" of the wars of recorded history. "Unhappily," he 
concludes, "history proves that war is, in a certain sense, the habitual state of 
mankind, which is to say that human blood must flow without interruption 
somewhere or other on the globe, and that for every nation, peace is only a 
respite."72 Perhaps his most famous and most graphic account of the natural 
world occurs in the St. Petersburg Dialogues, where he writes: 
In the vast domain of living things, there reigns a manifest violence.... 
As soon as you leave the domain of insensible substances you find the 
decree of violent death written on the very frontiers of life. Even in the 
vegetable kingdom the law can be perceived.... But as soon as you enter 
the animal kingdom, the law suddenly becomes frighteningly obvious. 
68 Collins, From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Con- 
sciousness and the Idea of Orders in Renaissance England (New York, 1989), 4, 6, 7, 28, 
29, 32. 
69 Considerations on France, ch. 3, 28-29 (OC, I, 35-36). 
70 Ibid., ch. 3, 28 (OC, 1, 34). 
71 Ibid., ch. 3, 28 (OC, I, 34). 72 Ibid., ch. 3, 23 (OC, I, 28). Also see R. A. Lebrun, "Joseph de Maistre's 'Philo- 
sophic' View of War," in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for 
French History, 7 (1981), 43-52. 
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A power at once hidden and palpable shows itself continually occupied 
in demonstrating the principle of life by violent means. In each great 
division of the animal kingdom it has chosen a certain number of 
animals charged with devouring the others;... There is not an instant of 
time when some living thing is not being devoured by another. Above 
all these numerous animal species is placed man, whose destructive 
hand spares nothing that lives;... a superb and terrible king, he needs 
everything and nothing resists him.... Yet what being will exterminate 
him who exterminates all else?... It is man who is charged with 
slaughtering man. But how can he accomplish this law, he who is a 
moral and merciful being, who is born to love, who cries for others as 
for himself ?... It is war that accomplishes the decree. Do you not hear 
the earth itself crying out and demanding blood? The blood of animals 
does not satisfy it, nor even that of criminals spilled by the sword of the 
law. If human justice struck them all, there would be no war, but it 
reaches only a small number of them and often it even spares them 
without suspecting that this cruel humanity contributes to the necessity 
of war.... The earth does not cry out in vain; war breaks out. Man, seized 
by a divine fury, foreign both to hatred and anger, goes to the battlefield 
without knowing what he intends or even what he is doing.... Nothing 
can resist the force that drags men into combat ... an innocent murderer, 
a passive instrument in a formidable hand.... Thus, from the maggot up 
to man, the universal law of violent destruction of living things is 
unceasingly fulfilled. The entire earth, continually steeped in blood, is 
only an immense altar on which every living thing must be immolated 
without end, without restraint, without respite until the consummation 
of the world, until the extinction of evil, until the death of death.73 
Maistre ties this grim view of natural and social disorder to his political 
theory. In an essay written during the French Revolution he enlists Hobbes in 
support of his argument that the origin of government lies in the anti-social 
disposition of human nature. 
Hobbes was perfectly right, provided that one does not give too great 
extension to his principles; society is really a state of war. We find here 
the necessity for government. Since man is evil, he must be governed; 
it is necessary that when several want the same thing a power superior 
to the claimants judges the matter and prevents them from fighting. 
Therefore a sovereign and laws are needed; and even under their empire 
is not society still in potential field of battle? And is the action of 
magistrates anything but a pacifying and permanent power that inter- 
poses itself without respite between the citizens to prohibit violence, 
73 St. Petersburg Dialogues, dialogue 7, 216-17 (OC, V, 22-25). 
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command peace, and punish the violators of the Truce of God? Do we 
not see that when political revolutions suspend this divine power, 
unfortunate nations that experience these political commotions quickly 
fall into the state of war, that force seizes the sceptre, and that this nation 
is tormented by a deluge of crimes. Therefore government is not a matter 
of choice. It is even the result of the nature of things: it is impossible that 
man be what he is and that he not be governed, for a being both social 
and evil must be under the yoke.74 
Around the time that Maistre wrote these words he also remarked that 
"the state of nature for man is therefore to be what he is today and what he 
has always been, that is to say sociable."75 In his essay "De l'etat de nature" 
Maistre writes, paraphrasing Marcus Aurelius, that "man is social, because 
he is reasonable; let us also add: but he is corrupt in his essence and in 
consequence he must have a government."76 This is "the twofold law of 
man's nature" which explains the "internal combat within himself."77 
Given the essential precariousness of social and political life, the exist- 
ence of strong feelings of individual self-interest is, on Maistre's view, a 
symptom of, not a remedy for, the disintegration that perpetually threatens 
civil order. He condemned the "murderous egoism"78 of individual wills 
which, far from providing a reliable basis upon which society could be 
grounded, further attenuates the fragile bonds of society, plunging civiliza- 
tion into complete chaos and civil war. "If each man makes himself the judge 
of the principles of government," he writes, "you will see immediately the 
rise of civil anarchy or the annihilation of political sovereignty."79 Instead, 
Maistre emphasizes the need for obedience to authority and what he calls 
"individual abnegation."80 The individual must "lose itself in the national 
mind, so that it changes its individual existence for another communal 
existence, just as a river flows into the ocean still exists in the mass of water, 
but without name and distinct identity."81 Like Hobbes, Maistre reasoned 
that it is better to be subject to any sovereign (even a Robespierre or a 
Napoleon) than to none at all.82 His criticism of the French Revolutionary 
leaders was not that they undermined authority, but rather that they abused it. 
74 "De l'6tat de nature," ch. 2 (OC, VII, 563). 
75 "De la Souverainet6 du Peuple," book 1, ch. 2 (OC, I, 321). 
76 
"De 1'6tat de nature," ch. 1 (OC, VII, 556). 7 St. Petersburg Dialogues, dialogue 10, 293 (OC, V, 172). 
78 
"De la Souverainet6 du Peuple," book 1, ch. 1 (OC, I, 409). 
79 Ibid., book 1, ch. 10 (OC, I, 376). 
80 Ibid., book 1, ch. 10 (OC, I, 377). 
81 Ibid., book 1, ch. 10 (OC, I, 376). 
82 Maistre made a secret attempt to arrange a meeting with Napoleon, which was 
unsuccessful; and see F. Vermale, "Joseph de Maistre et Robespierre," Annales Revolu- 
tionnaires, 12 (1920), 117-20. 
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This was, however, a lesser evil in Maistre's eyes than the liberal attempt 
to limit power. For Maistre disorder was the public evil most to be avoided. 
In his first major work, Considerations on France (1797), he not only 
attacked the Revolution but attempted to refute the arguments of more 
moderate constitutional republicans and liberals such as Benjamin Constant. 
One lesson that many liberals such as Constant drew from events in France 
after 1793 is that a constitution must be devised and adopted that would 
permanently prevent the juggernaut of political power-whether led by 
divine right absolutists or revolutionary Jacobins-from crushing individual 
liberties. This, they held, requires the dispersal of social and political power, 
which had been concentrated and centralized under both Bourbons and 
Revolutionaries. 
Maistre drew exactly the opposite political lesson from the same events. 
He did not interpret the Revolution as an argument against a strong and 
unified political sovereign. Quite the opposite, in fact. In Considerations on 
France, written partly to refute Constant's "ugly pamphlet" De la force du 
gouvernement actuel de la France et de la necessite de s y rallier (1796), 
Maistre refers favorably to Rousseau when defending the "absolute and 
indivisible" nature of sovereignty and condemning the popular liberal idea 
that sovereignty can be represented.83 The Revolutionary leaders, to the 
extent that they were able to marshall the forces of the nation and take 
decisive measures to save France from her enemies, were preferable to 
carping liberal critics like Voltaire, who were responsible for unleashing the 
Revolutionary tiger from its cage in the first place, and were opposed to 
authority per se. The Jacobins, on the other hand, "leave in the imagination a 
certain impression of grandeur that is the result of the immensity of their 
success."84 Thus, the counter-revolutionary Maistre wrote of Robespierre 
that this "infernal genius alone could perform this prodigy.... This monster 
of strength, drunk with blood and success, this terrifying phenomenon ... was 
at once a terrible punishment sent upon French men and the sole means of 
saving France."85 This position with respect to the Revolutionary leaders is 
quite consistent with Maistre's overall belief in the imperative of authority 
and the need for a sovereign that is "one, inviolable, and absolute."86 
It is important to note that, although some measure of violent disorder is 
inescapable in human affairs, according to Maistre, this takes place in the 
broader context of a providential order ordained by God. Society, as part of 
the natural order, must be considered in the general frame of a supernatural 
order which is subject to God's true design for the cosmos. One of the most 
distinctive features of Maistre's account of the French Revolution in Consid- 
erations on France is the way in which he interprets it in such providential 
83 Considerations on France, ch. 4, 71-72 (OC, I, 48-49). 
84 "De la Souverainete du Peuple," book 1, ch. 8 (OC, I, 360). 
85 Ibid., ch. 2, 41 (OC, I, 18); and ch. 1, 27 (OC, I, 5). 
86 Ibid., book 2, ch. 1 (OC, I, 418). 
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terms. Like Hegel, Maistre was, in part, undertaking a theodicy in writing 
this work. "If Providence erases," he claims, referring to the destruction 
wrought by the Revolution, "it is no doubt in order to write."87 Thus, the 
Revolutionaries are merely "the instruments of Providence" working to- 
wards ends unknown to them.88 "We cannot repeat too often," Maistre 
writes, "that men do not lead the Revolution; it is the Revolution that uses 
men. They are right when they say it goes all alone. This phrase means that 
never has the Divinity shown itself so clearly in any human event."89 
Running through the violent maelstrom of revolution, in other words, is a 
divine logic that is perfectly ordered, even though it is not apparent to human 
beings. This theme is also central to Maistre's St. Petersburg Dialogues, 
subtitled "Conversations on the Temporal Government of Providence." For 
Maistre, God uses disorder in the affairs of men and in nature to maintain a 
greater, cosmic equilibrium. 
Conclusion 
At the heart of the social psychology of both Maistre and Freud is a 
question that had commanded the attention of social contract theorists such 
as Hobbes and Rousseau and would fascinate sociologists such as Comte and 
Durkheim: what keeps human beings together? According to Maistre and 
Freud, the French Enlightenment tended to overlook this fundamental ques- 
tion, with disastrous consequences. The striking social naivete of the 
philosophes blinded them to the deep tensions and complexities in social life 
and the powerful disintegrative forces that pose a constant threat to social 
order. For the philosophes, society, being natural, reflects the spontaneous 
harmony they attributed to nature. As such, social order does not in itself 
present a problem to them. The "problem," as far as most were concerned, 
was to maximize individual freedom by liberating the mind and power of 
human beings from the fetters of social custom and prejudice. This entailed a 
reduction in social control so that individuals would be capable of reasoned, 
independent action. 
We have seen that Maistre and Freud agreed with the philosophes that 
humans are naturally social beings. At the same time, however, they also 
placed great stress on the anti-social tendencies in human nature and the deep 
tensions that exist at the heart of social life. In this they were the heirs of 
Hobbes. Consequently, they did not support the "emancipatory" social and 
political project of the French Enlightenment. Maistre and Freud feared that 
significantly loosening social, religious, and political bonds on individuals 
could precipitate the collapse of the fragile edifice of society, as evidenced, 
87 Considerations on France, ch. 2, 20 (OC, I, 21). 
88 Ibid., 19. 
89 Ibid., 7-8. 
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Maistre believed, by events in France in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. Contractarianism is correct, on this view, to the extent that it con- 
ceives of social order as something that depends on a considerable measure of 
human artifice, rather than as something that arises naturally and spontane- 
ously. The philosophes and their successors failed to diagnose a deep-seated 
"problem of order" that lies at the very heart of modem civilization. The 
emphasis of Maistre and Freud on the power of the centrifugal forces that 
threaten social order and the weakness of our rational faculties in the face of 
them, led both to seek surrogates for reason to combat these disintegrative 
pressures. Foremost among these for Maistre are religious and patriotic 
sentiments, the "solid bases of all possible first and second order institu- 
tions."90 
The social theory of Maistre, like that of Freud, defies categories accord- 
ing to which society is held to be either natural or artificial. Instead, individu- 
als are seen as complex and dynamic beings, with many contradictory 
tendencies. It is this novel combination that furnishes Maistre's thought with 
a sinister modernistic edge that gives his work, like Freud's, a disturbing 
relevance to the twentieth-century reader missing in more moderate varieties 
of conservatism. 
University of Wales, Cardiff. 
90 Ibid., book 1, ch. 12 (OC, I, 408). 
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